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FREEDOM OF BREACH: THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION APPLIED TO CONTRACT CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a recent college graduate seeking a full-time position as a
schoolteacher who has a choice between two positions.  The first is a
sixth grade teaching position at a charter school and the second is a
sixth grade teacher position at a Lutheran school.  There are advan-
tages and disadvantages to each.  The charter school pays a little
more, yet she likes the fact that the Lutheran school has offered her
an employment contract that guarantees her a two-year term.  Wary of
rumors that the charter school has low retention rates for new teach-
ers, she thinks she should choose job security over higher pay.  Addi-
tionally, she is Lutheran and likes the idea that she can teach students
both secular and religious topics at that school.  Therefore, after
stressful deliberation, she chooses to accept the offer from the Lu-
theran school.
The board of directors at the Lutheran church affiliated with the
school sends her an employment contract that stipulates two years of
employment in exchange for a $34,000 salary and various benefits.
She carefully reads through the contract and notices a termination
clause.  It allows the church to terminate her employment before the
two-year period ends if the church finds just cause to do so.  The
clause is vague, and does not specify exactly what “just cause” may be.
It does, however, indicate that conducting herself in a manner grossly
inconsistent with the values of the church may qualify as cause for
termination.  The nondescript language does not bother her to a great
extent, however, because she has no intention of conducting herself in
such a way.  As a religious person, she does not plan on violating the
teachings of her faith and she knows she would never do anything to
jeopardize her employment or tarnish her professional reputation.
Thus, she signs the contract and begins teaching.
Although the job starts out well, about four months into her tenure
the teacher’s relationship with the principal becomes strained.  The
principal is a micromanager who picks on her seemingly for no good
reason.  One day, she overhears the principal speaking to a member of
the staff about how a family friend is seeking a teaching position at a
religious school.  The principal says that it is unfortunate that there
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are no openings at the school because his friend would be a great asset
to the school.
Two weeks later, the new teacher is terminated by the board of di-
rectors, notwithstanding the overwhelming support she has received
from the students in her class, their parents, and other veteran teach-
ers at the school.  She is stunned, considering her employment con-
tract was supposed to secure her employment at the school for two
years.  When she brings up the contract at her termination meeting, a
member of the board informs her that her firing is legal under the
termination clause.  Unsure of how she could have possibly violated
the clause, she denies that her behavior has given the church good
cause for termination and demands an explanation.  The board mem-
ber tells her that the totality of her conduct regarding her working
relationship with the principal is inconsistent with the values of the
Lutheran faith.
It is the middle of the school year and no schools are hiring, includ-
ing the charter school she turned down.  Feeling devastated and be-
trayed, she decides she has no choice but to consult an attorney.  An
employment attorney agrees to take her case, but quickly confirms the
church’s claim that courts cannot adjudicate this type of conflict.  Be-
cause courts cannot consider religious questions, such as whether the
teacher violated the beliefs of the Lutheran church pursuant to the
termination clause, there is no remedy for the teacher in the legal sys-
tem.  Additionally, a former co-worker at the school with whom she
stayed in contact informs her who has taken her place: the principal’s
family friend whom she overheard him discussing.  She relays this in-
formation to her attorney, excited that she has proof that the school
illegally breached the contract in favor of another teacher.
Surprisingly, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First
Amendment, the schoolteacher still will not be able to bring her claim,
despite the new evidence showing that her firing was pretextual.  In
2012 the Supreme Court validated the “ministerial exception,” a well-
established rule used by courts for decades.1  In Hosanna-Tabor Ev-
angelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court
held that the ministerial exception prevents civil courts from interfer-
ing with a religious institution’s decision to hire or fire a “minister” in
1. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see
also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Re-
ligious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 124 (2009) (noting that the
doctrine originated in 1972).  Though the ministerial exception had been recognized by lower
courts for decades, see, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985), Hosanna-Tabor marked the first acknowledgment of the exception by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
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the context of antidiscrimination laws.2  Doing so would violate both
Religion Clauses in the First Amendment.3  Accordingly, religious in-
stitutions increasingly assert the ministerial exception as a defense in
litigation.4
This Comment focuses on what the Supreme Court did not decide
in Hosanna-Tabor: the appropriate application of the ministerial ex-
ception to breach of employment contract lawsuits.5  Far less has been
written about the application of the ministerial exception to breach of
contract cases than its application to discrimination cases.  The Court
in Hosanna-Tabor explicitly stated that its ruling applied to claims
under antidiscrimination statutes, and not to breach of contract
claims.6
Part II of this Comment discusses basic religion clause jurispru-
dence and “church autonomy” cases, up to and including Hosanna-
Tabor, and also touches on employment law relationships.7  Part III
identifies and compares two approaches used by lower courts in ap-
plying the ministerial exception.8  The first, the “wait-and-see” ap-
proach, is more plaintiff-friendly and allows employees of religious
institutions to bring claims without entangling the courts in religious
2. See id.
3. Id.  The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 983 (2013) (describing
the ministerial exception as “a rule that always grants victory to the employer”).
5. It should be noted that there are many other unanswered ministerial exception questions
after the Hosanna-Tabor decision.  Other unanswered questions include the following: what ex-
actly are the parameters for classifying an employee as “ministerial”; what characteristics does
an institution need to have in order to qualify as “religious” and therefore be covered under the
ministerial exception; and how does the ministerial exception apply to other types of claims,
including tort, whistleblower, and retaliation? See generally, e.g., Summer E. Allen, Comment,
Defining the Lifeblood: The Search for a Sensible Ministerial Exception Test, 40 PEPP. L. REV.
645 (2013); Zoe¨ Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181 (2014); Marci
A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy
Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225 (2007).  For the most part, these
other unanswered questions are beyond the scope of this Comment, which is limited to breach of
contract claims with few other uncontested issues.
6. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit
brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her.  Today we hold
only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit.  We express no view on whether the excep-
tion bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or
tortious conduct by their religious employers.  There will be time enough to address the applica-
bility of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.” (emphasis added)).
7. See infra notes 15–84 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 85–130 and accompanying text.
1066 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1063
questions.9  Alternatively, the “presumptive entanglement” approach
presumes that virtually any employee asserting a breach of contract
claim against her religiously affiliated employer will ultimately entan-
gle the court with religion.10  Accordingly, the presumptive entangle-
ment approach requires that claims be dismissed on First Amendment
grounds.  This Comment argues that the presumptive entanglement
approach gives the ministerial exception an unnecessarily broad scope
and advocates for the wait-and-see approach because employment
contracts are distinguishable from at-will employment.11  Part III also
analyzes these alternate approaches in light of fundamental principles
of contract law, including consideration, unequal bargaining power,
and good faith and fair dealing.12  Additionally public policy weighs
against an absolutist approach to these cases.
Part IV discusses the impact and importance of how the ministerial
exception doctrine unfolds in the contract context.13  Particularly, the
approach ultimately chosen by courts in breach of contract claims
could give employers guidance as to how other types of employment
claims will be treated in the religious context.  Finally, Part IV dis-
cusses the impact that increased autonomy and power for religious
institutions will have on their employees.14
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE AND CONTEXT
A. The Religion Clauses Generally
The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from burdening
an individual or group’s religious liberty.15  The Free Exercise Clause
doctrine underwent major changes in the Supreme Court case of Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, which remains one of the leading Free
Exercise cases.16  In Smith, the issue was whether Oregon could deny
unemployment benefits to two Native Americans who were fired for
using peyote at a religious ceremony.17  The Supreme Court ulti-
mately held that Oregon’s prohibition of peyote use and consequent-
ial denial of unemployment benefits to citizens terminated for peyote
use was constitutional.18  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, relied
9. See infra notes 85–112 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 113–130 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 131–213 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 162–190 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 191–213 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 210–213 and accompanying text.
15. Robinson, supra note 5, at 201–02.
16. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 992.
17. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
18. Id. at 890.
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on the notion that the prohibition against drug use was a “neutral,
generally applicable law,” and therefore not a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause.19
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making
law “respecting an establishment of religion,” or favoring a religious
group over another, or benefitting one religion.20  The Supreme Court
has used numerous tests to analyze Establishment Clause cases over
the years.21  For instance, the test set forth by the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman establishes a three-prong inquiry: (1) Does the law have a
secular purpose?; (2) Does the law have the primary or principle ef-
fect of advancing religion?; and (3) Does the law excessively entangle
the government with religion?22  At least one First Amendment
scholar has posited that the “core principle” of the Establishment
Clause is neutrality.23  Another has noted “the Court has begun to
increasingly shift its focus to an emphasis on neutrality.”24
B. Pre-Hosanna-Tabor Supreme Court Church-State Jurisprudence:
Property Disputes and Bishop Removal
The following cases illustrate the Supreme Court’s hesitation in in-
terfering with the autonomy of religious institutions during litigation.
First, in Watson v. Jones, the Court heard a case involving an intra-
church property dispute between two factions of the Walnut Street
Presbyterian Church.25  The Watson decision marked one of the first
cases in which the Supreme Court dealt with the extent to which
courts may involve themselves in disputes over the ownership of
church property.26  The lower courts focused on deciding which fac-
tion had the authority to control the property.27  However, the Su-
preme Court chose to answer a different question: whether or not it
19. Id. at 880 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–61 (1982)).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Robinson, supra note 5, at 203.
21. Richard Albert, The Separation of Higher Powers, 65 SMU L. REV. 3, 6 (2012) (discussing
the Court’s varying applications of “a number of constitutional tests to demarcate the boundary
separating God from man,” including “the neutrality principle, the Lemon test, the endorsement
test, and the coercion test”).
22. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at
the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV.
1137, 1192 (2009).
23. Albert, supra note 21, at 25–27.
24. Mark W. Cordes, The First Amendment and Religion After Hosanna-Tabor, 41 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 299, 299 (2014).
25. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 681 (1871).
26. Daniel J. Marcinak, Comment, Separation of Church and Estate: On Excluding Parish
Assets from the Bankruptcy Estate of a Diocese Organized as a Corporation Sole, 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 583, 607 (2006).
27. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 681–82.
1068 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1063
should be deciding the dispute at all.28  In a 7–2 decision, the Court
held,
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest . . . church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their
application to the case before them.29
According to the Court, this concept distinguished the American sys-
tem of government from the English system,30 and granting such un-
touchable authority to churches was one of the essential rights that
came with forming a religious union.31  The Court also stated that,
when it comes to religious questions, unlike purely legal questions,
ecclesiastical courts are the best judges because leaders of churches
are far more versed in faith and doctrine than any civil judge.32
Therefore, the Presbyterian tribunal’s decision was final, and the
American courts could not provide a remedy.33
Eighty years later, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North
America.34 Kedroff involved an intra-church feud between two fac-
tions of the Russian Orthodox Church—one American and one Rus-
sian—regarding control over the church property.35  Central to that
dispute was the determination of which faction’s archbishop would
lead the church.  To help resolve the disputes, the New York legisla-
ture passed a statute giving authority to the American faction.36  The
dispute subsequently made its way to the Supreme Court, and the
28. Id. at 713–14.
29. Id. at 727.
30. Id. (“We concede at the outset that the doctrine of the English courts is otherwise.”).
31. Id. at 729 (“It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish
tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be
binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance . . . .”).
32. Specifically, the Court opined that
[t]he decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other judicial tribunal, are final, as
they are the best judges of what constitutes an offence against the word of God and the
discipline of the church.  Any other than those courts must be incompetent judges of
matters of faith, discipline, and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as
to attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction,
would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would do any-
thing but improve either religion or good morals.
Id. at 732 (quoting German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282, 291 (1846) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
33. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 732.
34. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
35. Id. at 95–96.
36. Id. at 95.
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Court used the case as an opportunity to reaffirm and extend the prin-
ciples it created in Watson.37
The Court recognized that in order to resolve the property dispute
it would have to intervene in the church’s selection of the arch-
bishop.38  In an opinion written by Justice Reed, the Court ruled that
neither the New York legislature nor the civil courts could decide that
issue.39  The Court relied on the Free Exercise Clause, applied
through the Fourteenth Amendment, to find the statute favoring the
American faction unconstitutional.40  Once again, although on differ-
ent grounds, the Supreme Court held that American civil courts could
not overturn the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals.41 Kedroff ex-
tended this idea to reach a church’s right to choose its own clergy.42
Twenty years later the Supreme Court addressed religion again, this
time in the employment context.  The third case, and the one which
leads into Hosanna-Tabor, took an approach which more closely re-
sembled an employment lawsuit.  In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Dio-
cese for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich, a
bishop of a Serbian Orthodox Church had been suspended and re-
moved from his position by the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the
Holy Synod of the Church.43  He filed suit, alleging that the Holy As-
sembly of Bishops and Holy Synod had not followed the church’s in-
ternal regulations when they removed him.44  The Illinois Supreme
Court agreed and ruled that his removal was invalid.45
37. See id. at 110.
38. Id. at 96–97 (“Determination of the right to use and occupy Saint Nicholas depends upon
whether the appointment of Benjamin by the Patriarch or the election of the Archbishop for
North America by the convention of the American churches validly selects the ruling hierarch
for the American Churches.”).
39. Id. at 119–21.
40. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 107.  The Fourteenth Amendment states,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter wrote, “These consid-
erations undermine the validity of the New York legislation in that it enters the domain of relig-
ious control barred to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 126
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120–21.
42. Mark P. Strasser, A Constitutional Balancing in Need of Adjustment: On Defamation,
Breaches of Confidentiality, and the Church, 12 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 325, 334 (2013).
43. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 697–98
(1976).  A synod is an “ecclesiastical council lawfully assembled to determine church matters.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1588 (9th ed. 2009).
44. See id. at 698.
45. Id.; see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d
268 (Ill. 1975).
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that the state court had impermissibly
involved itself in a case which required “the interpretation of ambigu-
ous religious law and usage.”46  By attempting to discern whether the
Holy Assembly of Bishops had abided by its regulations, the Illinois
Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds.47  Interestingly, the Court
explicitly dismissed the relevance of rationality, measurable objective
criteria, and “fundamental fairness” to matters of religious disputes.48
The Court once again concluded, this time in an employment context,
that ecclesiastical tribunals could not be trumped by civil courts.49
These three cases represent the doctrine of “the deference rule.”50  In
addition to holding that the courts must avoid cases muddled with re-
ligion, the rule also stands for the point that courts must accept deci-
sions of religious authorities even if those decisions are arbitrary.51
C. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC
In 2012, the Supreme Court was finally ready to recognize the min-
isterial exception in the landmark case, Hosanna-Tabor.  Hosanna-Ta-
bor was a church that also operated a Lutheran school for children in
kindergarten through eighth grade.52  The respondent, Cheryl Perich,
had taught fourth grade for five years at the school.53  Perich taught
both secular and religious classes54 and led student prayers and devo-
tional exercises on a daily basis.55  In addition to attending the
46. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708–09 (quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396
U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
47. See id. at 712–13.
48. Id. at 714–15.
49. Id. at 724–25.
50. David J. Overstreet, Note, Does the Bible Preempt Contract Law? A Critical Examination
of Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric’s Breach of Employment Contract Claim Against a
Religious Organization, 81 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271–73 (1996).
51. Id. (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713).
52. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2012).
53. Id. at 700.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also sued on her
behalf. Id. at 701.  The EEOC
is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job
applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including
pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.  It is
also illegal to discriminate against a person because the person complained about dis-
crimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimi-
nation investigation or lawsuit.
Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc (last visited
June 19, 2014).
54. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
55. Id.
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school’s chapel service every week, she conducted the service twice a
year.56
In 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy and took disability
leave at the beginning of the school year.57  In January 2005, after she
told the principal that she would soon be fit to return, the principal
informed her that her teaching position had been filled through the
end of the school year.58  Perich nevertheless reported for work on the
first day she was cleared by her doctor to return.59  When the principal
turned her away, Perich refused to leave.60  Over the phone that after-
noon, Perich was informed by the principal that she would probably
be fired for her actions that day.61  After Perich threatened to sue, she
received a letter that Hosanna-Tabor had terminated her for refusing
to leave the school and then “threatening to take legal action.”62
Perich filed a claim against the church under two provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  She alleged that the church
discriminated against her because of her disability and that the church
had retaliated against her for threatening to assert her ADA rights.63
At summary judgment, Hosanna-Tabor argued that Perich’s claims
were barred by the ministerial exception because she was a ministerial
employee that was fired for a religious reason—threatening to sue was
a violation of the Synod’s “belief that Christians should resolve their
disputes internally.”64  The district court agreed and granted Hosanna-
Tabor’s motion for summary judgment on ministerial exception
grounds.65  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s
decision and remanded the case.66  The court acknowledged the minis-
terial exception but held it was inapplicable to Perich because her job
involved more secular duties than religious duties; thus, she was not a
minister.67  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and the case was
argued in October of 2011.68
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 701; cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12203(a) (2006).
64. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701; see also EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 886–87 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
65. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 892.
66. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.
2010)
67. Id. at 780–81.
68. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the history of
the separation of church and state, covering everything from the
Magna Carta and the American colonies to Watson, Kedroff, and
Milivojevich.69  The Court acknowledged that, although “the Courts
of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a ‘ministerial
exception[]’ grounded in the First Amendment,” the Supreme Court
had not.70  In a unanimous opinion, the Court finally recognized the
legitimacy of the ministerial exception:
We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.  The members of
a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers.  Re-
quiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or pun-
ishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision.  Such action interferes with the internal gov-
ernance of the church, depriving the church of control over the se-
lection of those who will personify its beliefs.  By imposing an
unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments.  According the state the power to
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates
the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement
in such ecclesiastical decisions.71
After confirming what lower courts had recognized for years,—the
validity of the ministerial exception—the Supreme Court then consid-
ered whether it applied to Perich’s situation.72  The Court held that it
did; Perich had a considerable amount of religious training, claimed
certain ministerial tax allowances, and led her students in worship.73
Despite all of her secular duties, there was enough of a ministerial
element to her job to afford her a ministerial label for the sake of the
exception.74  The Court also declared that any analysis of whether Ho-
sanna-Tabor’s religious reason for termination was pretextual
“miss[ed] the point of the ministerial exception.”75  According to
Chief Justice Roberts, the ministerial exception did not apply exclu-
sively to a church’s decision to terminate an employee for a religious
reason.76  Rather, it applied to all hiring and firing decisions of minis-
ters for any reason.77
69. Id. at 702–05.
70. Id. at 705.
71. Id. at 706.
72. Id. at 707. See generally Robinson, supra note 5 (exploring the question of which intu-
itions the ministerial exception encompasses).
73. Id. at 707–08 (majority opinion).
74. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
75. Id. at 709.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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The most significant part of the Court’s holding, for the purposes of
this Comment, came in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion.
While addressing the scope of the ruling the Court stated that its deci-
sion applied to the facts before it: an employee challenging her termi-
nation for an employment discrimination suit.78  The Justices
“express[ed] no view on whether the [ministerial] exception bars other
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of con-
tract . . . by their religious employers.  There will be time enough to
address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and
when they arise.”79  Therefore, while the Court’s decision finally rec-
ognized the existence of the exception, it left open questions of appli-
cation.  There are significant distinctions between employment claims
based on antidiscrimination statutes and claims based on common law
breach of contract, which suggests they might interact differently with
the ministerial exception.
D. Overview of At-Will Employment, Employment Contracts, and
Cause for Termination
Before analyzing how the ministerial exception and Hosanna-Tabor
might be applied to breach of contract claims, it is helpful to give a
brief overview of employment contract claims and how they differ
from ordinary discrimination claims.  Under the common law, the re-
lationship between employees and employers—absent a formal con-
tract agreement—is referred to as “at-will employment.”80  Under the
at-will employment rule, both the employer and employee are free to
end the employment relationship for any reason, or for no reason at
all.81  This freedom of termination is not absolute; for instance, federal
and state legislatures may enact laws forbidding termination based on
discriminatory motives, most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.82  Strictly at-will employment relationships are beyond the
scope of this Comment because they do not involve a binding employ-
ment contract.
Alternatively, employees and employers may alter their at-will rela-
tionship by entering into an employment contract.  By entering into a
fixed-term contract, employers and employees are abandoning the
freedom provided by an at-will relationship and binding themselves
78. Id. at 710.
79. Id.
80. See Steven S. Gensler, Note, Wrongful Discharge for In-House Attorneys? Holding the
Line Against Lawyers’ Self-Interest, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 515, 518–19.
81. Id. at 518.
82. See id. at 519.
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together for a period of time.83  Terminating the employee early is
generally considered a breach of contract, though exceptions may ap-
ply when the parties mutually agree to early termination or when the
employer terminates the employee for “good cause” or “just cause.”84
Thus, the employer and employee can alter the default at-will em-
ployment relationship by entering into an employment contract, giv-
ing rise to a new cause of action for the employee should she be
terminated: breach of contract.  Against that backdrop, courts face the
question of how to adjudicate those claims when the employer in-
vokes the ministerial exception.
E. Applications of the Ministerial Exception
The lack of a clear mandate from the Supreme Court, both before
and after Hosanna-Tabor, has left lower courts with discretion to ap-
ply the ministerial exception to breach of contract claims.  In applying
the ministerial exception, courts appear to employ one of two meth-
ods: the “wait-and-see” approach or the “presumptive entanglement”
approach.
1. Wait-and-See Approach
Some lower courts have been willing to remand certain breach of
contract claims when it appears that the ministerial exception was ap-
plied prematurely.85  In Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of
United Methodist Church, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied a
seemingly liberal approach to the breach of religious employment
contract dilemma.86  In Minker, a minister sued his employer, a
church, for age discrimination and breach of contract.87  The case re-
volved around a district superintendent’s promise that the minister
83. See David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Em-
ployment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 988 (1998).
84. See Overstreet, supra note 50, at 278 & n.75.
85. See, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3rd Cir. 2006); Second Episcopal
Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812 (D.C. 2012) (holding that the
ministerial exception did not bar a reverend from bringing her breach of contract claim because
the record suggested the court will not be entangled in church doctrine); Pardue v. Ctr. City
Consortium Schs., Inc., Civil Action No. 02-5459, 2003 D.C. Super. LEXIS 30 (D.C. Super. Ct.
July 29, 2003) (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment on breach of contract claim);
Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2012-SC-000519-DG, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 161, at *3
(Ky. April 17, 2014) (holding that the ministerial exception did not bar plaintiff’s breach of con-
tract claim because of the employer’s “willing participation”); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840
(N.J. 2002) (holding that former seminarian may be able to bring his breach of implied contract
claim without running afoul of the ministerial exception).
86. Minker, 894 F.2d 1354.
87. Id. at 1355.
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“would be moved to a congregation more suited to his training and
skills, and more appropriate in level of income, at the earliest appro-
priate time.”88  Four years passed and the church did not grant the
minister his transfer.89  Interestingly, “[t]he contract claim was based
both on the district superintendent’s oral promises to find him a more
suitable congregation, and on passages from the Book of Discipline—
‘the book of law of the United Methodist Church’—concerning the
assignment of pastorships.”90
The district court dismissed the minister’s case for failure to state a
claim.91  On appeal, the minister set forth two alternate arguments re-
garding his contract claim.92  First, he contended “that the [F]irst
[A]mendment cannot bar enforcement of his private employment
contract because the issue of breach does not implicate [F]irst
[A]mendment principles.”93  His alternate argument was that regard-
less of whether the facts would implicate religion, the lower court pre-
maturely dismissed his claim because it did not afford him “an
opportunity to show that his contract claim [did] not create an exces-
sive entanglement with church religious policy.”94
Beginning with the claim arising out of the Book of Discipline, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that it “could not interpret or en-
force such a provision without running afoul of the [F]irst
[A]mendment.”95  Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court’s
dismissal of that aspect of the contract claim.96  The court, however,
took a much closer look at the minister’s oral contract claim.97
First, the court held that the district superintendent’s promise to
transfer the minister to a more suitable congregation did in fact create
a contractual relationship.98  It then held, citing Watson v. Jones, “[a]
church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through con-
tracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”99  After
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1356.
92. Minker, 894 F.2d at 1356.  The minister also appealed the dismissal of his age discrimina-
tion claim.  The appellate court found that the claim was rightfully dismissed on free exercise
grounds. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1358.  The court went further to “hold that the interpretation of the appointment
and antidiscrimination provisions of the Book of Discipline is inherently an ecclesiastical matter;
it follows that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Minker’s contract claim.” Id. at 1359.
96. See id. at 1359.
97. Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1871)).
1076 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1063
acknowledging the Church’s contention that permitting courts to hear
religious contract claims could infringe on the Free Exercise Clause,
the court stated, “[n]evertheless, the [F]irst [A]mendment does not
immunize the church from all temporal claims made against it.”100
Accordingly, the court ruled that the minister should be afforded an
opportunity “to demonstrate that he can prove his case without
resorting to impermissible avenues of discovery or remedies.”101
The court stated that theoretically, the breach of contract claim re-
quired merely a determination of whether the church promised the
minister a transfer to a more suitable congregation, whether there was
consideration for that promise, and whether the church failed to offer
the transfer.102  Furthermore, because the minister had already been
replaced, the minister’s remedy would be money damages, which miti-
gated the risks to church autonomy and would merely force a church
to uphold a voluntary promise.103
The Minker decision, however, does not help the ministerial plain-
tiff as much as it may appear.  The court noted that on remand,
church-state entanglement issues could once again foreclose the min-
ister’s claim.104  Instead, the court’s decision might have been a swipe
at the premature nature of the lower court’s dismissal, and not at the
dismissal itself.105
This wait-and-see method was adopted by the Third Circuit as well.
In Petruska v. Gannon University, the Third Circuit heard a former
chaplain’s appeal of the dismissal of a host of claims, including breach
of contract.106  The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal
for all claims except for breach of contract.107  With regards to the
100. Id. at 1360.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360 (“Similarly, Minker’s injury can be remedied without court
oversight.  Money damages alone would suffice since Minker already has a new pastorship.
Maintaining a suit, by itself, will not necessarily create an excessive entanglement.  Furthermore,
as the remedy would be limited to the award of money damages, we see no potential for distor-
tion of church appointment decisions from requiring that the Church not make empty, mislead-
ing promises to its clergy.”).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1360–61 (“Thus, while the [F]irst [A]mendment forecloses any inquiry into the
Church’s assessment of Minker’s suitability for a pastorship, even for the purpose of showing it
to be pretextual, it does not prevent the district court from determining whether the contract
alleged by Minker in fact exists.”).  Unfortunately, it appears that the minister in Minker decided
not to pursue further litigation against the church, as no case on remand appears in the record.
106. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3rd Cir. 2006).  The claims included gender
discrimination, retaliation, civil conspiracy, negligent retention and supervision, fraudulent mis-
representation, and breach of contract. Id. at 301–02.
107. Id. at 312.
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contract claim, the court began its analysis by recognizing the “en-
tirely voluntary” nature of the church’s contractual obligations.108  Ac-
cordingly, the contract claim passed the Free Exercise Clause test and
the court then analyzed the claim under the scope of the Establish-
ment Clause.109  The court held that, “at the outset,” the claim did not
necessarily entangle the court in religion.110  Citing Minker, the Third
Circuit remanded the contract claim and held that it was too soon to
dismiss on ministerial exception grounds.111  However, the court did
hint that the claim might not survive the second look by the lower
court, stating, “If Gannon’s response to Petruska’s allegations raise[s]
issues which would result in excessive entanglement, the claims may
be dismissed on that basis on summary judgment.”112
Minker and Petruska illustrate that some courts are patient when it
comes to dismissing breach of contract claims brought by ministerial
employees. These courts recognize that it is plausible for a ministerial
employee to bring a breach of contract claim without necessarily en-
tangling the court in religious questions, while also expressing caution
that discovery may invoke such impermissible questions.  Both courts
recognize that the voluntary nature of employment contracts warrants
a closer look than traditional discrimination claims.
2. Presumptive Entanglement
A stricter approach, referred to in this Comment as “presumptive
entanglement,” is best illustrated by DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congrega-
tion.113  In that case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the
dismissal of a breach of contract claim brought by the director of faith
formation at a Catholic church.114
108. Id. at 310 (“On its face, application of state contract law does not involve government-
imposed limits on Gannon’s right to select its ministers: Unlike the duties under Title VII and
state tort law, contractual obligations are entirely voluntary.”).
109. Id. at 310–11.
110. Id. at 311.
111. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 312.
112. Id.
113. DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 2012).  For more instances of
courts taking the presumptive entanglement approach, see, for example, Washington v. African
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., No. 11-CV-6087-CJS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108117
(W.D.N.Y. September 16, 2011) (dismissing breach of contract claim under the ministerial ex-
ception); Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192 (Conn. 2011) (dismissing breach of
implied contract and promissory estoppel claims); Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish Cmty., Inc.,
982 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that “Indiana courts have applied the ministe-
rial exception broadly to dismiss breach of contract claims against religious institutions”); Prince
of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater, 28 A.3d 1171 (Md. 2012) (dismissing breach of contract
and breach of implied contract claims).
114. DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 882–83 (plurality opinion).
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The director, DeBruin, had a seemingly typical employment con-
tract with her employer.115  The contract described her duties, salary,
benefits, and length of employment.116  More importantly, the con-
tract contained a termination clause in which the parish promised not
to discharge the employee “without good and sufficient cause.”117  It
further promised that the parish would be required to give the em-
ployee notice if it was dissatisfied with her work.118  Four months into
her one-year contract term, the employee was terminated by the
church.119
Once terminated, the employee brought a lawsuit alleging breach of
employment contract.120  Arguing that the church terminated her
without “good and sufficient cause” pursuant to the contract, she
sought the remainder of her salary due as damages.121  However, the
church interestingly did not even attempt to assert that it had “good
and sufficient cause” for the termination.122  Instead, the church im-
mediately moved to dismiss based on the ministerial exception.123
The church argued that, because the employee’s position was ministe-
rial, and because it was a religious institution, any “court review of St.
Patrick’s reason for terminating DeBruin would constitute impermis-
sible interference with St. Patrick’s religious mission” in violation of
the Wisconsin Constitution.124
115. See id. at 883.
116. Id.  The contract also described “the facilities to which DeBruin would have access as
Director of Faith Formation, and the procedures for employee evaluation and annual contract
renewal.” Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 883.  The clause, in its entirety, stated:
The PARISH agrees that the DIRECTOR OF FAITH FORMATION shall not be dis-
charged during the term of this contract, without good and sufficient cause, which shall
be determined by the PARISH.  The PARISH agrees that the Pastor of the PARISH
will be responsible for giving the employee notice of any dissatisfaction with service or
conduct.  Dismissal may be immediate or within a time frame determined by the
PARISH.
Id.
119. DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 883 (plurality opinion).  The contract was entered into on July 1,
2009 and the termination took place on October 5, 2009. Id.
120. The employee also brought a promissory estoppel claim on the same grounds. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 883–84.  The Wisconsin Constitution reads in relevant part,
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of con-
science shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall
any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any pref-
erence be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall
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The employee countered by arguing that the ministerial exception
applies to antidiscrimination claims but not contract claims, because
breach of contract cases are governed by neutral principles of law.125
She “claimed that applying such neutral principles of law would not
constitute impermissible government action because the court could
examine [her] complaint and determine the truth or falsity of her alle-
gations without interfering with the religious institution’s mission.”126
Citing Hosanna-Tabor, Milivojevich, and Kedroff, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the ministerial exception protected St. Pat-
rick’s from liability.127  The ministerial exception gave the church “the
absolute right to terminate DeBruin for any reason, or for no reason,”
ignoring both the fixed-term contract and the termination clause.128
The court rejected the wait-and-see approach taken by the Third Cir-
cuit in Petruska, instead holding that “any inquiry into the validity of a
religious institution’s reasons for the firing of a ministerial employee
will involve consideration of ecclesiastical decision-making.”129  The
court then held that there was no distinction between causes of action
based on contract theory versus statutory theory, holding that ruling
on either would violate the Free Exercise Clause.130
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evaluating the Methods
A key distinction between these two approaches is the way in which
they apply the ministerial exception to breach of contract claims, rela-
tive to antidiscrimination claims.  The wait-and-see approach distin-
guishes these types of claims; the presumptive entanglement approach
treats them the same.  This Comment argues that the wait-and-see ap-
proach is fairer to the plaintiff and more reflective of the limited hold-
ing in Hosanna-Tabor.
The first clue that the wait-and-see approach is correct comes from
the Hosanna-Tabor decision itself.131  The Court explicitly drew a line
any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious
or theological seminaries.
WISC. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
125. DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 884 (plurality opinion).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 885–86.
128. Id. at 888.
129. Id. at 889.
130. Id.
131. Ironically, the two cases in this Comment illustrating the view recognizing Hosanna-Ta-
bor’s contract-discrimination distinction occurred years before the Hosanna-Tabor decision. See
generally Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3rd Cir. 2006); Minker v. Balt. Annual Con-
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and said that the case before it addressed only discrimination suits,
and the Court did not express any view on breach of contract ac-
tions.132  Drawing this line was significant because the opinion drew
very few others.133  It offered no explicit parameters about which clas-
ses of employees may be considered “ministerial” under the excep-
tion, and it did not make an effort to decide what kinds of entities may
be considered protected “religious institutions.”  Because the Su-
preme Court made a distinction between discrimination claims and
breach of contract claims, the wait-and-see approach taken in Pe-
truska and Minker better reflects the Court’s limited holding in Ho-
sanna-Tabor.
The Supreme Court may have refused to include breach of contract
claims within the scope of its holding because of the voluntary element
of contract cases.134  In other words, churches, like nonreligious insti-
tutions, are not required to offer their ministerial employees contracts;
they choose to do so.135  They are free to maintain at-will relationships
with all of their employees, and most do.136  Alternatively, antidis-
crimination statutes apply to all employees regardless of whether they
are at-will or contract employees.137
According to the Minker court, “A church is always free to burden
its activities voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully
enforceable in civil court.”138  The court continued, “courts may al-
ways resolve contracts governing ‘the manner in which churches own
property, hire employees, or purchase goods.’”139  Accordingly, the
Minker court stated that these religious employers “may be held liable
upon their valid contracts.”140
Distinguishing between voluntary contracts and default at-will em-
ployees for purposes of the ministerial exception does not undermine
ference of. United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  The case illustrating the
opposite view occurred months after Hosanna-Tabor was decided. See DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d
878.
132. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012).
133. See Strasser, supra note 42 at 336 (noting the “Court addressed a very narrow issue”).
134. See generally Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359 (noting that “[a] church is always free to burden
its activities voluntarily through contracts”).
135. Overstreet, supra note 50 at 284.
136. See id.; see also Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will Employ-
ment: The Search for a Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 141, 142 (1998) (explaining that “most
employees are at-will”).
137. Overstreet, supra note 50, at 289–90.
138. Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359 (emphasis added).
139. Id. (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)).
140. Id. (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1171 (4th. Cir. 1985)).
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the purpose of the exception.141  In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court stated
that the purpose of the exception is to safeguard a church’s “authority
to select and control” its ministerial employees.142  By applying the
ministerial exception to at-will relationships, churches are only subject
to an action if they act affirmatively to alter the employment relation-
ship through a contract.143  In other words, a church that is forced to
abide by an employment contract has voluntarily put itself in that
position.144
Another voluntary step that the church must take to subject itself to
liability is to make the contract a fixed-term of employment by includ-
ing an end date or including a set amount of time.145  Most courts
presume an at-will relationship when a contract does not show intent
to establish a fixed term.146  Even further, it is the church’s decision to
include an early termination clause such as the one seen in DeBruin,
which stated “The PARISH agrees that the DIRECTOR  OF FAITH
FORMATION shall not be discharged during the term of this con-
tract, without good and sufficient cause.”147  It is hard to blame an
employee for interpreting this clause to mean that their employment
is secure as long as no “good and sufficient cause” occurs.  Addition-
ally, the next clause in DeBruin suggests that “good and sufficient
cause” will be a function of the employee’s conduct by stating that the
Church agrees to provide notice to the employee if there are problems
with her service or conduct.148
In many employment relationships, the employer drafts the contract
and the employee accepts its terms or declines the offer; little negotia-
tion occurs.149  It follows that an employer, religious or otherwise, re-
141. See Overstreet, supra note 50, at 285.
142. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709
(2012).
143. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 145 (citing Tomie v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d
1036, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2006)) (noting that churches can use contracts to waive their autonomy).
144. Overstreet, supra note 50, at 289–90.
145. See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa 1995) (holding that
the at-will employment doctrine is a “gap-filler,” presumed when a contract does not explicitly
set out a duration).
146. J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 839 (noting that “courts in virtually
every American jurisdiction continue to presume than an indefinite term employment contract is
terminable at will by either party”).
147. DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Wis. 2012) (plurality
opinion).
148. See id.
149. See Allison E. McClure, Comment, The Professional Presumption: Do Professional Em-
ployees Really Have Equal Bargaining Power When They Enter Into Employment-Related Adhe-
sion Contracts?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1506–07 (2006).
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tains substantial autonomy in deciding to offer an employment
contract and what terms to include.150  In this way, some employment
contracts may be akin to a contract of adhesion.151  These notions of
autonomy and volition underscore the idea that the ministerial excep-
tion should treat contract claims and statutory claims differently.
1. What Happens on Remand?
The wait-and-see method used by both the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals involves a cautionary
approach to remanding claims.  After holding that the ministerial ex-
ception had been exercised prematurely, both courts gave hints that
the exception could be applied eventually.  The Third Circuit stated in
Petruska that if on remand, the employer “raise[d] issues which would
result in excessive entanglement, the claims may be dismissed on that
basis on summary judgment.”152  The court did, however, add that
hearing the contract claim did not appear to turn on a religious ques-
tion, “at least not at the outset.”153
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Minker offered a stronger
disclaimer.154  While remanding the case, it “acknowledge[d] that the
contract alleged by Minker threatens to touch the core of the rights
protected by the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause.”155  The court also stated
that it “agree[d] that any inquiry into the Church’s reasons for” not
transferring the pastor to a more suitable parish pursuant to the con-
tract “would constitute an excessive entanglement in its affairs.”156
These restrictive disclaimers seem to contradict the optimism reflected
later in the opinion; the court goes on to suggest that if the employee
“can prove his case without resorting to impermissible avenues of dis-
150. Id. (“[T]he employer generally controls the terms of the contract, whether any negotia-
tions occur, and whether the employee is ultimately hired.”).
151. See id. at 1507 (“[M]any courts have held that non-professional employees have unequal
bargaining power when they enter into employment-related contracts.”).
152. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 312 (3rd Cir. 2006).
153. Id. On remand in 2008, a district court dismissed Petruska’s discrimination claims after
she attempted to replead them as Title IX claims instead of Title VII claims.  Her breach of
contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims were not dismissed.  Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., Civil Action No. 1:04-cv-80, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54884 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 31, 2008); see
also Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question: Refining the Ministerial
Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 233, 281 n.297 (2012).
154. Jeffrey Hunter Moon, Protection Against the Discovery or Disclosure of Church Docu-
ments and Records, 39 CATH. LAW. 27, 31 (1999) (noting that “[t]he court was very explicit in
[Minker]: it limited the appropriate boundaries of litigation to only those areas legitimate for
court inquiry and resolution, and then clearly limited permissible discovery to those areas.”).
155. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360
(1990).
156. Id.
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covery or remedies,” his claim would survive.157  It also added that,
theoretically, the breach of contract issue can be reviewed permissibly
“by a fairly direct inquiry into whether [the employee’s] superinten-
dent promised him a more suitable congregation, whether [the em-
ployee] gave consideration in exchange for that promise, and whether
such congregations became available but were not offered to [the
employee].”158
These disclaimers suggest, somewhat contradictorily, that inquiring
into why the church refused the transfer would be a violation of the
Establishment Clause, yet also state that there might be a permissible
way for the employee to make his case without entangling the court in
religion.159  The Minker court does not explain how to determine a
breach of a church-employment contract while respecting a church’s
autonomy.160  Some experts, however, posit that the parties would
need to stipulate to certain religious questions during discovery in or-
der for the case to proceed.161
B. Can These Two Methods Be Reconciled with Fundamental
Principles of Contract Law?
“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty.”162  This Restatement definition of a
contract begs the question, if courts cannot review whether or not a
promise was kept—in DeBruin one year of employment,163 in Minker
a transfer,164 and in Petruska employment165—in order to provide a
remedy, are these “contracts” even contracts?  The way the courts
have handled these claims contradicts fundamental principles of con-
tract law and public policy.166
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 146.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
163. DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Wis. 2012) (plurality
opinion).
164. Minker, 894 F.2d at 1355.
165. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2006).
166. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in Hosanna-
Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405, 426 (2013) (noting that the Hosanna-Tabor Court appeared to
ignore ordinary principles of contract law).
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1. Consideration
A fundamental requirement in contract formation is consideration;
each party must promise to perform for the other party.167  In the case
of a fixed-term employment contract, consideration may be an em-
ployee’s guarantee of a source of income for a defined period of
time.168  Alternatively, the employee may promise the employer that
she will perform her job satisfactorily for the time set out in the con-
tract.169  This may also mean that she gives up any potential opportu-
nities for a better paying or more enjoyable job during that time
period.
This Comment’s introductory hypothetical scenario illustrates this
doctrine.  The imaginary schoolteacher had a choice between two
jobs.  She could have chosen to accept the higher paying position at
the charter school, but consciously decided that the promise of stable
employment offered by the religious school made that position more
valuable.  Because she had bargained for the promise of stability, she
agreed to accept a lesser salary.
The problem when applying the doctrine of consideration to the
ministerial exception is that the church does not give complete consid-
eration to the employee.  A church is able to pay less money to an
employee based on a promise that the employee can rely on the
church.170  This is especially unfair in a case in which, but for the per-
ceived stable employment, the employee would not have accepted the
lesser salary.171  This notion of inequity leads into two other funda-
mentals of contract law: uneven bargaining power and the implied
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.
2. Bargaining Power and Good Faith
A potential problem of applying the presumptive entanglement ap-
proach to all breach of contract claims is that there is a potential for
abuse of the doctrine by religious institutions.  First, consider the rela-
tive bargaining power of the two parties, the church (employer) and
the employee.  As this Comment has discussed, the church most likely
retains the power to (1) use an employment contract and (2) draft its
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71.
168. See Millon, supra note 83, at 988 (describing how an employee may bargain for a defined
term contract).  In DeBruin, it was one year of employment. DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 883 (plu-
rality opinion).
169. Overstreet, supra note 50, at 290 (noting that churches may enter into contracts in order
to “lock up” an employee’s services).
170. See Millon, supra note 83, at 978 (noting that workers may bargain for job security); see
also id. at 988 (“Presumably [a] worker would pay for job security by accepting a lower wage.”).
171. See id. at 978, 987–88.
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contents.  This, however, is only one indication that the church has far
more bargaining power over the employee.172  The sophistication and
resources available to the two parties also diminishes any equality of
bargaining power.173  If a religious institution is aware of the ministe-
rial exception when offering an employment contract, it would know
that, under a presumptive entanglement approach, it will likely never
have to explain its reasoning to the courts.
One striking piece of DeBruin is that the church created a termina-
tion clause agreeing not to terminate the employee without “good and
sufficient cause.”174  It also agreed to give notice to the employee if it
became dissatisfied with her performance.175  However, when the em-
ployee brought suit alleging that the contract had been breached, the
church did not even attempt to honor the terms it drafted.176  Instead,
the church plainly asserted that the courts had no right to enforce the
contract.177
This is a curious response to a lawsuit regarding a contract that the
church itself had created.  Surely, one can imagine neutral and non-
religious reasons for having “good and sufficient cause” to terminate
an employee before the end date of a fixed-term contract.  Defenses
asserting that the employee did not meet the employer’s objective
goals or expectations, was generally incompetent, was excessively late
or absent, improperly used church resources, refused to perform em-
ployment duties, and the like could all present the possibility that a
civil court could review the claim without entangling itself in religion.
This begs an important question: did the church in DeBruin know that
the contract was unenforceable when it created it?  And furthermore,
if the church was aware that the contract could not be litigated in
court, why did it create the contract at all?  When the employee read
and signed the contract, she likely believed that it was enforceable.178
Many employees would presume that being hired depends on their
172. Of course, this advantage is not inherent to religious employers; it applies to secular
employment relationships as well.
173. See McClure, supra note 149, at 1516 (noting that the employee entering the employment
contract may have “never encountered this type of contract before, and therefore, [may] not
have any actual knowledge of the types of provisions it contains”).
174. DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Wis. 2012) (plurality
opinion).
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See id.  This defense was based on both state and federal constitutions. Id.
178. But see Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Ho-
sanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 37–39).  Professor Lund
makes a compelling argument that, in many breach of contract claims, the parties may under-
stand the “promise” of employment to be unenforceable in court.
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signing of the contract.  Nothing suggests to them that the contract is
unenforceable.  Even in a case like Hosanna-Tabor, where the con-
tract came in the form of a verbal promise, there may still be detri-
mental reliance on the part of the employee.179
The opportunity for abuse of the doctrine arises when a legally so-
phisticated religious institution creates an employment contract set-
ting out a fixed term, while at the same time knowing that it does not
have to fulfill its promise to employ the individual for the entire term.
This abuse of bargaining power becomes bad faith if a church uses the
illusion of an enforceable contract in order to convince the employee
to accept lesser compensation in situations where, but for the promise
of security, the employee would not have accepted the offer.180
Universal notions of fairness and fundamental principles of contract
law are both offended when an employer “gets” something—whether
it is the benefit of an employee who believes she is “locked in” to her
position and thus, will not “jilt” the employer for a better opportunity
during the term, or the ability to pay less salary or benefits to the
employee—but does not “give up” anything in return.181  The em-
ployer has been enriched by these benefits without being forced to
hold up its end of the bargain.182  When the ministerial exception ap-
plies with equal force to a contract claim and a statutory claim, a
church will always be free to use the exception as an “escape hatch”
when it no longer wants to honor an employment contract.183
C. The Wait-and-See Approach Is the Lesser of Two Evils
Of the two approaches to breach of contract claims, the approach
that allows a plaintiff to at least try to establish his breach of contract
claim is more consistent with the purpose of the ministerial exception.
When courts automatically treat a religious employment contract as
unenforceable through presumptive entanglement, they encourage re-
ligious institutions to deceptively present illusory promises in the form
of what appears to be a contract.184  This goes beyond the scope of the
179. See Gedicks, supra note 166, at 426 (noting that Perich appeared to rely to her detriment
on the Hosanna-Tabor’s promise that she could return to her job).
180. See Millon, supra note 83, at 987–88 (noting that if an employee is worried about losing
her job, she may bargain for job security by accepting a lower payment).
181. See Overstreet, supra note 50, at 290 (“To excuse a religious institution from complying
with a commitment into which is has voluntarily entered is unjust and illogical.”).
182. Id.
183. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 148 (2013) (noting that the “power that Hosanna-Tabor gives to
churches is sobering”).
184. For an illustration of illusory promises, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2
cmt. e (1981).
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ministerial exception—to protect a church’s decision to choose who
represents the faith185—and instead gives a church free reign to swin-
dle an unsuspecting employee into accepting less compensation under
the illusion of job security.  The wait-and-see approach still allows re-
ligious institutions to select who represents the faith; yet it also forces
them to perform their contractual obligations.
By unequivocally refusing to hear a breach of contract case and in-
quire into why a church made a decision not to honor a contract, a
“presumptive entanglement” approach potentially dismisses claims
that have nothing to do with religion.  For example, consider a person
hired by a religious institution to raise funds.  Assume his employment
contract gives him one year of employment and states that, as long as
he meets monthly fundraising goals, his contract will not be termi-
nated prior to the end date.  If the fundraising is accounted for objec-
tively in the institution’s books, a civil court can simply look to
whether or not the employee met the goals and determine if the em-
ployer had a right to terminate him based on the goal provision of the
contract.
Under the wait-and-see approach, a court would allow the em-
ployee to argue that he had a valid contract, that he met the consider-
ation requirement, and that the employer terminated him despite his
meeting objective criteria set out by the employer in the contract.186
Alternatively, under presumptive entanglement, the employee would
not even be afforded the opportunity to state a nonreligious case be-
cause the court would assume that religious questions would enter the
fray.  The ministerial exception would preclude liability for the
church.
One may also see that the presumptive entanglement approach goes
too far by considering the consequences if that same employee’s con-
tract tied his meeting or not meeting fundraising goals to commission
bonuses instead of guaranteed employment.  For instance, if the con-
tract stated that the employee would receive a small bonus every time
he met a monthly fundraising goal, and he met the goal but was de-
nied payment, would the presumptive entanglement method cause a
court to refuse to hear his claim for wages due?  After all, a church,
185. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697
(2012) (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”).
186. See Gedicks, supra note 166, at 426 (explaining that applying ordinary principles of con-
tract law to a terminated ministerial employee could possibly resolve the case without violating
the First Amendment: “The detrimental-reliance inquiry is simple and secular: Did Hosanna-
Tabor promise Perich her job back after she recovered?  Did she rely to her detriment on that
promise?  The answer to both questions seems to be, ‘yes’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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like the one in DeBruin, could simply argue that any inquiry into why
the church chose to not make the payment is inquiring into an ecclesi-
astical zone forbidden by the ministerial exception.187  Alternatively,
the wait-and-see method would allow a plaintiff to make her case that
she is owed money as long as she can do so without forcing the court
to consider matters of religious doctrine.188
Because a church is free to maintain at-will employees, it cannot be
said that its autonomy to hire and fire ministerial employees is vio-
lated if a court uses a wait-and-see approach.189  Having an employee
sign a document that has a start date and end date gives that employee
an understandable impression that a bilateral promise has been made,
and it is reasonable for that employee to rely on that promise.190  Ac-
cordingly, courts can sensibly apply the ministerial exception differ-
ently between contract claims and discrimination claims.
IV. IMPACT
A. Extension to Other Employment Claims
Statutory employment discrimination claims are the only type of
claim that the Supreme Court has held is categorically subject to the
ministerial exception.191  As lower courts apply the Supreme Court’s
holding in Hosanna-Tabor to future religious employment decisions,
more questions about the ministerial exception’s applicability to other
types of employment claims will be answered.  The future application
of Hosanna-Tabor to breach of contract claims will signal how other
types of employment claims, such as retaliation, whistleblower, or tort,
will be treated in the context of religious institutions.
Retaliation and whistleblower claims present an interesting chal-
lenge to the broader view of the ministerial exception.  Legal protec-
tion for employees from retaliation following “whistleblowing,” or
187. See DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 889 (Wis. 2012) (plurality
opinion) (“[A]ny inquiry into the validity of a religious institution’s reasons for the firing of a
ministerial employee will involve consideration of ecclesiastical decision-making.”).
188. See Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the employee “should be allowed to demonstrate that he can
prove his case without resorting to impermissible avenues of discovery or remedies”); see also
Griffin, supra note 4, at 1011–12 (noting that the harm to religious institutions is arguably less
severe when the plaintiff seeks only money damages as opposed to reinstatement).
189. See McGowan, supra note 136, at 142 (explaining that “most employees are at-will”).
190. See Gedicks, supra note 166, at 426 (noting that Perich appeared to rely to her detriment
on the church’s promise that she could return to her job upon her recovery).
191. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012) (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minis-
ter, challenging her church’s decision to fire her.  Today we hold only that the ministerial excep-
tion bars such a suit.”).
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“unpopular disclosure of employer corruption,” began increasing in
the early 1970s.192  The public policy behind whistleblower protections
may relate to many areas, including public health, privacy, and corpo-
rate reporting practices.193  The rationale for legal protection from re-
taliation for employees stems from the idea that “[w]ithout employees
who are willing to risk adverse employment consequences as a result
of whistleblowing activities, the public would remain unaware of
large-scale and potentially dangerous abuses.”194  Additionally,
whistleblower protection laws provide a deterrent effect to potential
wrongdoers.195
Whistleblower claims are similar to employment discrimination
claims in that they are rooted in statute.196  These statutes may be
federal or state-enacted.197  Every state provides employees some
form of whistleblower protection, yet “[t]he major areas of difference
include the class of protected employees, the appropriate recipient of
the employee’s report, the nature of the employer activity that the
employee reports, whether the employee’s report must be accurate,
and the available remedies.”198
A determination that presumptive entanglement applies to breach
of contract claims would strengthen the viability of the ministerial ex-
ception against whistleblowers that have been retaliated against.199
The worst-case scenario might involve an employee of a religious in-
stitution being retaliated against for reporting sexual abuse within the
institution, and then having no recourse against the employer.200  The
problem of sexual abuse in religious institutions is not limited to the
Catholic Church.201
192. See Lois A. Lofgren, Comment, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the
Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing
of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV 316, 318 (1993).
193. Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a
More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2008).
194. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dolan v. Cont’l Airlines, 563 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich.
1997)).
195. Id. at 1635–36
196. See id. at 1638.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1641–42 (footnotes omitted).
199. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 5, at 230–31 (explaining how the ministerial exception
shields clergy in employment disputes in the childhood abuse context).
200. This scenario is not merely hypothetical. See Griffin, supra note 4, at 1013–16 (detailing
numerous examples of employees being terminated for reporting illegal conduct and not having
recourse against the employer).
201. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 225 (noting that the problem of childhood sexual abuse in
religious institutions in nondenominational); see also Emily C. Short, Comment, Torts: Praying
for the Parish or Preying on the Parish? Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Mal-
practice, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 183, 184–85 (2004).  Studies suggest substantial abuse occurs within
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The Catholic Church’s position is that courts should not be involved
in dealing with cases of abuse by clergy.202  Instead, it believes those
incidents are better handled independently through mediation.203
This idea stems from both the principle of church-state separation and
the Church’s belief in conciliation and forgiveness.204
Arguably, the Catholic Church’s stance against litigation over abuse
is analogous to the evangelical Lutheran rule against lawsuits among
members.205  Accordingly, if a ministerial employee had knowledge of
abuse occurring between a priest and a child parishioner, and reported
the abuse, the institution could terminate the employee and cite the
ministerial exception as an affirmative defense.  After all, the ministe-
rial exception protects a church’s decision to fire an employee, the
employee acted in a way that arguably contradicts the beliefs of the
church, and under a presumptive entanglement approach, the court is
in no position to analyze whether or not the church’s reasoning was
pretextual.206
The impact of such a precedent, effectively holding that
whistleblower protection laws insulate an employee from only non-
religious employer retaliation, would be against public policy.207  If
employees are not willing to risk the adverse consequences (retalia-
tion) that may follow disclosure of abuse, then abusers will not be
exposed.208  Additionally, if abusers know that the whistleblower pro-
tections do not apply to religious institutions, then they will no longer
provide a deterrent effect.209
the Church of England, the Southern Baptist Church, the Presbyterian Church U.S.A., the
United Methodist Church, and among other evangelical ministers, as well as among Buddhist
teachers and American rabbis. Id. at 184–86.  Unfortunately, victims in approximately 90% of
childhood sexual abuse cases will never report the abuse to the proper authorities.  Hamilton,
supra note 5, at 227.
202. See Michelle Rosenblatt, Article, Hidden in the Shadows: The Perilous Use of ADR by
the Catholic Church, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 115, 127 (2005) (stating that “[b]ecause of the
constitutional concerns regarding the separation of church and state, the Church has taken the
position that the most appropriate way to deal with cases of clergy abuse is through independent
Church mediation”).
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. Hosanna-Tabor asserted that Perich’s “threat to sue the Church violated the Synod’s
belief that Christians should resolve their disputes internally.”  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 701 (2012).
206. See DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 889 (Wis. 2012) (plurality
opinion) (“[A]ny inquiry into the validity of a religious institution’s reasons for the firing of a
ministerial employee will involve consideration of ecclesiastical decision-making.”).
207. See Griffin, supra note 4, at 1013–14.
208. Id. at 1013–15 (collecting cases).
209. See Gerard Sindzack, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1635–36 (2008) (noting
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The general impact on employees of religious institutions is also
noteworthy.  The mean hourly wage of employees of religious institu-
tions is only about $18 per hour.210  Furthermore, this figure is skewed
upwards by wealthy outlier positions, such as chief executives, finan-
cial managers, attorneys, and other upper management positions.211
The median hourly wage for religious employees, only $14.69, reflects
the true financial position of these employees.212  In the context of
whistleblowers, it is likely that employees will be risk-averse in deter-
mining whether to disclose the conduct of their employers.213  More
power for religious institutions in the employer–employee relation-
ship means less bargaining power for employees of those institutions.
These employees may ultimately end up having to settle for less em-
ployment rights than those who work for nonreligious institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Hosanna-Tabor did not determine whether the ministe-
rial exception applies to breach of contract cases, it is significant for
being the first Supreme Court case to acknowledge the validity of the
exception.214  Now that it is confirmed that a plaintiff’s discrimination
case against her religious employer will cede to the exception, the
lower courts must determine whether breach of contract cases should
be treated the same way.  Thus far, courts have not been able to agree
on whether it should find presumptive entanglement of religion or
wait and see if the plaintiff can establish a claim apart from religion.215
Because the Supreme Court explicitly held that its holding in Ho-
sanna-Tabor did not apply to breach of contract cases,216 courts that
apply the presumptive entanglement approach mistakenly assume that
the ministerial exception has a broad scope.  Breach of employment
the necessity of adequately protecting whistleblowers because, “despite . . . their important role
as legal monitors, whistleblowers are frequently the victims of retaliation”).
210. NAICS 813100 Religious Organizations, Religious Organizations – May 2012 National
Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_813100.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2014).
211. See id. (noting that financial managers, human resources managers, executives, and legal
employees in religious institutions average over $90,000 salaries).
212. See id.
213. See Griffin, supra note 4, at 1013–15 (listing instances where reporting misconduct led to
the termination of the employee without legal recourse).
214. Chopko & Parker, supra note 153, at 235.
215. Compare, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d
1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3rd Cir. 2006), with, e.g.,
DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 2012), and Dayner v. Archdiocese of
Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192 (Conn. 2011).
216. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012).
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contract claims should be treated differently than employment dis-
crimination claims because of the voluntary nature of employment
contracts.  Churches and other religious institutions voluntarily alter
the at-will employment relationship by forming a legal contract and,
accordingly, should be held to their contractual obligations.  Addition-
ally, when religious employers allow employees to essentially bargain
against themselves through an employment contract that is ultimately
unenforceable, that shows bad faith on the part of the institution.  Al-
though the ministerial exception serves a very important purpose in
protecting the autonomy of religious institutions, the application of
the doctrine should uphold its purpose rooted in the First Amend-
ment, and not give a religious institution any additional power at the
expense of employees.
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